Tag-Archive for » German «

Bombers: Britain

Just prior to the outbreak of war the RNAS had been given the responsibility of protecting England from air attack.  It was a responsibility they felt, at the beginning, unprepared for.  Churchill, bleakly prophetic, told the Cabinet that, “…I cannot feel that our arrangements to cope with it are yet in a satisfactory state.  Loss and injury, followed by much public outcry, will probably be incurred in the near future.”

The threat of Zeppelin attack hung heavy on the minds of Churchill and Captain Murray Suerter, director of the air department of the Royal Navy.  Nobody had any idea how to intercept a Zeppelin in the air, and so Churchill and Suerter concentrated on attacking the airship bases.

The Zeppelin sheds were very large, presenting a relatively easy target.  If the shed contained an airship at the time, all the better, but destroying these hangers was in itself beneficial.  They were essential for storing the Zeppelins which needed protection from high winds when not in flight.

On the 22nd of September four aircraft took off from Antwerp to bomb the Zeppelin sheds at Cologne and Dusseldorf.  Due to heavy fog only one of the planes found its target and though the pilot managed to drop his bombs little damage was done.

The RNAS tried again on the 8th of October 1914 with more success, destroying a Zeppelin at Dusseldorf.  On November 21st a flight of Avro 504s bombed the Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen.  On Christmas Day, 1914, they flew seven seaplanes off from three seaplane tenders and attempted to attack the Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven.

The raid failed to do much damage, but proved the viability of using ships to extend the bombing range of aircraft.  These early experiences prompted the RNAS to order the development of a bomber capable of carrying a large bomb-load.  In Suerter’s words, the RNAS needed “a bloody paralyzer of an aeroplane.”

The innovative Louis Strange of the RFC was also experimenting with bombing techniques.  He managed to destroy trucks by dropping petrol bombs from his plane, but dissatisfied with dropping bombs by hand he came up with the idea of attaching the bombs to racks on his wings, and dropping them by pulling a release wire.

He tried this out on his BE2c with great success in March of 1915, attacking a train at the station of Courtrai, and thus impeding the flow of German reinforcements during the Battle of Neuve-Chapelle.  This bombing raid was also the first RFC bombing raid that was planned from photo reconnaissance.

Cockpit of Sopwith Camel showing front mounted twin Vickers machine gunsAs 1915 progressed the RFC lost control of the air to the German Eindeckers.  The BE2cs, RE7s and Martinsydes suffered increasingly heavy losses until the British regained control of the air and received the next generation of aircraft.

The most important of these was the Sopwith 1½ Strutter which arrived at the front in early 1916.  It was produced both as a two seater fighter and as a single seater bomber.  The latter variant carried a 118kg (260 lb) bomb load.  Together with the less effective RE8 this plane carried the role of tactical bomber through the transition year of 1916 until more potent bombers arrived on the front.

(As a fighter the 1½ Strutter was also important as it was the first in a chain of winning Sopwith fighter designs culminating in the Camel.  The plane’s strange designation originated as a nickname, describing the one full inter-plane strut and the additional half strut connecting the upper wing to the fuselage.  Nicknaming Sopwith aircraft became something of a tradition.  The “Pup” was so nicknamed because it seemed to be a baby, or ‘puppy’, 1½ Strutter.  The “Camel” was named after the way the fuselage “humped” over the breeches of its twin Vickers guns.  In each case officialdom had frowned on the names but had been forced to eventually accept them.)

In November of 1916 the RNAS took delivery of the Handley Page O/100.  This twin-engined inline tractor plane, with a range of about 965 km (600 miles) and a bomb-load of 812 kg (1,790 lb), was Britain’s first multi-engined warplane, and it was the fulfilment of Suerter’s request for a “bloody paralyzer”.

The RNAS initially used the O/100 for reconnaissance purposes, but from March of 1917 it began using it with great effect as a night bomber against tactical targets.  It was joined by the DH4, Britain’s most successful day bomber of the war, which had a range of 676 km (420 miles) and could carry a bomb load of 210 kg (460 lb).

One O/100 was flown 3,220 kilometres (2,000 miles) to the island of Lemnos in the Aegean sea, where it took part in an offensive against Turkey.  On the 9th of July 1917 it bombed Constantinople.  Over the next months it was employed in tactical bombing raids and anti-submarine reconnaissance, but it returned to Constantinople on the 30th of September 1917.

Hugh TrenchardThis raid, however, ended in disaster.  Engine failure forced the plane down and the crew were captured.  The pilot of this plane was John Alcock.

A veteran of the RNAS, Alcock had mentored Collishaw of “Black Flight” fame when the latter arrived at the front with less than nine hours flying training.  In 1919 John Alcock and Arthur Brown became the first men to fly across the Atlantic non-stop.  Brown had also been a prisoner of war, having been captured by the Germans.  Sadly, Alcock was to die in an air crash six months after that record breaking flight.

In October 1917 Hugh Trenchard, commander of the RFC in France, was ordered to commence a strategic bombing campaign against German industrial targets.  To this end the 41st Wing was formed, taking squadrons from both the RFC and the RNAS.  The 41st flew DH4s, O/100s and the venerable Fe2B pusher which was proving its worth as a night bomber and ground strafer.  They later began re-equipping with the O/400, an improved version of the O/100 with a 910 kg (2000 lb) bomb load and a range of 965 km (600 miles).

For the first few months the 41st wing concentrated on attacking local targets, but they made their first long-distance raid when 10 Handley-Pages attacked the towns of Mannheim and Ludwigshafen.

By February of 1918 they were capable of mounting the first “round the clock” bombing raid, against the town of Trier, with the DH4s attacking by day and the Handley-Pages attacking by night.  In March they carried out a number of day raids, including raids of Mannheim, Mainz and Stuttgart, but this was at the price of six of the Handley-Pages, as the Germans were increasing their anti-aircraft fire and bolstering their fighter defence.

When the RAF was formed on the 1st of April 1918, the decision was made to increase strategic bombing activities.  Trenchard was placed in charge of this enlarged force, which became known as the “Independent Force, RAF”.

Trenchard preferred to bomb a number of targets, rather than concentrate on one.  He also preferred daylight bombing rather than night bombing, as he felt the day bombers were more accurate, but conditions in the field overruled him.

By July of 1918 his day bomber squadrons were suffering too high an attrition rate, and could not operate without fighter escort.  The bulk of the bombing effort was eventually carried out by the Handley-Page night bombers, which by September of 1918 were carrying Britain’s largest bomb, weighing 750 kg (1,650 lb).

These aircraft dropped two thirds of the 558,000 kg (1,230,000 lb) of bombs dropped by the Independent Force in the latter half of 1918.

At the signing of the armistice the RAF had just taken delivery of its most advanced bomber.  The Handley Page V/1500 was a four engined plane that could carry a bomb load of 3,400 kg (7,500 lb) from East Anglia to Berlin, but the plane was never used.

Enhanced by Zemanta

The Capture and Punishment of Dinant, 1914

Sited on the Meuse River and some 50km south of the Germansiege of Namur, the town of Dinant in Belgium fell to the German Third Army (under von Hausen) on 23 August 1914.  It was the latest step in the German strategy of overrunning Belgium during the month of August 1914.

Although the town fell to von Hausen’s troops on 23 August the occupation was not initially peaceful.  German soldiers who were repairing the town bridge were allegedly fired upon by local inhabitants.  In retaliation therefore the German authorities rounded up 612 men, women and children and shot them together; the youngest victim was a three-week-old baby.

The town was subsequently pillaged and many of its buildings destroyed by the rampant German force.  Although the massacre shocked public opinion around the world – particularly in neutral countries such as the U.S. – it merely formed part of the German army’s strategy of intimidating occupied Belgian territories as a means of securing maximum civilian co-operation.

Although a notorious incident in itself the massacre of Dinant was eclipsed by a similar, wider-scale action at Louvain two days later.  Both were exploited to the full by Allied propaganda.

Enhanced by Zemanta

The Battle of Mons, 1914

The Mons battle signified the first engagement between British and German forces on the Western Front, and began on 23 August 1914. The Battle of Mons comprises one of the so-called Battles of the Frontier that took place during August 1914, at Mulhouse,Lorraine, the ArdennesCharleroi - and Mons.

Having arrived in France on 14 August, and well behind schedule in its advance, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) under its Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French, was moving forward cautiously from the Belgian coast, in keeping with French’s character, his plan being to meet up with French General Lanrezac’s Fifth Army near Charleroi on the Sambre.

Before reaching Charleroi however, the BEF encountered cavalry patrols from the German First Army at Soignies on 22 August. French immediately made plans to attack the German forces, against intelligence advice and apparently unaware of its full strength and of its victories at Lorraine and the Ardennes.

Sir John FrenchChanging tack overnight, French ordered his five divisions to establish defensive positions at the nearby Mons Canal French’s surprise at meeting the German First Army was equalled by its commander, General von Kluck, who had just seen action at the Battle of the Sambre against General Lanrezac’s and was intent on chasing Lanrezac to the south.

Distracted, von Kluck determined to launch a frontal attack against the BEF on 23 August, having been forbidden by the German High Command from outflanking the BEF and possibly losing contact with von Bulow’s Second Army.

The British Commander-in-Chief ought not to have been too surprised at the sudden appearance and strength of the German army. As early as 7 August General Lanrezac, commanding the French Fifth Army, had warned Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, of a sizeable build-up of German strength into Belgium.

Joffre initially appeared not to heed Lanrezac’s warnings, perhaps because they conflicted with France’s pre-war battle strategy, Plan XVII, which assumed that Germany would not attack France via Belgium.

Sir Horace Smith-DorienMeanwhile French, who because the initial British-German contact had come via cavalry troops had effectively bought himself a day’s respite before battle commenced, deployed his two infantry corps, commanded by Smith-Dorrienand Haig, respectively, east and west of Mons across a forty kilometre front.

The eastern wing almost reached the retreating French Fifth Army under General Lanrezac, some eight miles away Edmund Allenby’s cavalry division was held in reserve in case of need.

At the start of the battle the British found themselves heavily outnumbered by their German opposition: 70,000 troops as opposed to 160,000, and 300 guns against 600 German.

Alexander von KluckDespite such odds, von Kluck’s offensive against General Smith-Dorrien following a preliminary artillery barrage, began disastrously, the Britishriflemen exacting heavy losses from the advancing German infantry.

Indeed, by mid-afternoon he had no progress to show for the offensive. Nevertheless over the course of the first few days of fighting the British had suffered some 1,600 casualties The efficiency of the British riflemen was such that von Kluck assumed that the enemy were using machine-guns.

Whilst von Kluck paused the attack in order to draft in reserves, French, having heard news that General Lanrezac had retreated and could therefore offer the British no assistance, ordered a strategic retreat to the British second line of defence.

Von Kluck renewed the offensive in the evening, by which time French had realised quite how strong von Kluck’s forces were. French therefore ordered Smith-Dorrien and Haig to further retreat; von Kluck did not at first give chase, choosing instead to address the heavy casualties inflicted earlier in the day. Ultimately however he inflicted almost 8,000 casualties upon the British rear-guard at the Battle of Le Cateau on 26 August.

The British Commander-in-Chief then undertook an extended retreat French himself recommended complete withdrawal to the coast, although Kitchener, the British war minister, rejected French’s suggestion, requiring the BEF to remain in contact with the French forces retreating to the Marne.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby, 1914

At approximately 8.10 on the morning of 16 December 1914 the First High Seas Fleet Scouting Group, commanded by Admiral Franz von Hipper, unleashed a bombardment of the North Sea English seaports of Hartlepool, West Hartlepool, Whitby and Scarborough.

Lasting until around 9.30am the bombardment (of 1,150 shells) resulted in some 137 fatalities and 592 wounded.  The two coastal defence batteries in Hartlepool (Heugh Battery and Lighthouse Battery) responded, firing 143 shells and damaging three German ships, including the heavy cruiser Blucher.

In spite of the inevitable outrage the incident raised among the British popular press and the public at large – which held the Royal Navy squarely to blame for failing to prevent the raid – the attack was viewed as legitimate in German naval quarters, with both Hartlepool and Scarborough deemed valid targets in light of their status as fortified towns.

The Royal Navy had in fact received advance warning of the raid by the naval intelligence unit (the so-called ‘Room 40′ group) and Admiral Warrender was despatched with a fleet of six battleships, four battlecruisers, four heavy cruisers, six light cruisers and eight submarines to intercept the German raiding force.  The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand FleetSir John Jellicoe, recommended attaching his force to provide backup to Warrender but this was not deemed necessary by the Admiralty.

However, while the raid was primarily conducted by Hipper and his force of five battlecruisers (SeydlitzMoltkevon der TannDerrflinger and Blucher) plus accompanying light cruisers and destroyers, he was followed by the might of the German High Seas Fleet under Commander-in-Chief FredErich Ingenohl.

Admiral Franz von HipperDuring the early morning of 16 December – prior to the attack – Warrender came within view of Ingenohl’s fleet but mistook the latter for a small raiding force.  Ingenohl in turn believed Warrender’s force to be Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet.

Deciding caution to be the better virtue Ingenohl turned the High Seas Fleet around en route for home: he nevertheless ordered Hipper to press on with the attack, but omitted to warn him of the British sighting.

Setting off in pursuit of Ingenohl Warrender himself changed course when advised via radio of the start of a bombardment further north – Hipper had begun his raid.  He therefore turned round and headed towards the north-sea coast; meanwhile eight pre-dreadnoughts set off from Rosyth and Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet put off from Scapa Flow, effectively encircling Hipper’s force.

In the event Hipper escaped immediate punishment for his action when an example of inefficient British signalling enabled him to evade Admiral David Beatty’s four battlecruisers, attached to the Grand Fleet.

Amid widespread clamour for the Royal Navy to catch Hipper, the latter’s decision to try and repeat his success in late January 1915 led to his interception at Dogger Bank on 24 January, where his squadron was defeated but managed to escape.

Enhanced by Zemanta

Raid on Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby, 1914

At approximately 8.10 on the morning of 16 December 1914 the First High Seas Fleet Scouting Group, commanded by Admiral Franz von Hipper, unleashed a bombardment of the North Sea English seaports of Hartlepool, West Hartlepool, Whitby and Scarborough.

Lasting until around 9.30am the bombardment (of 1,150 shells) resulted in some 137 fatalities and 592 wounded.  The two coastal defence batteries in Hartlepool (Heugh Battery and Lighthouse Battery) responded, firing 143 shells and damaging three German ships, including the heavy cruiser Blucher.

In spite of the inevitable outrage the incident raised among the British popular press and the public at large – which held the Royal Navy squarely to blame for failing to prevent the raid – the attack was viewed as legitimate in German naval quarters, with both Hartlepool and Scarborough deemed valid targets in light of their status as fortified towns.

The Royal Navy had in fact received advance warning of the raid by the naval intelligence unit (the so-called ‘Room 40′ group) and Admiral Warrender was despatched with a fleet of six battleships, four battlecruisers, four heavy cruisers, six light cruisers and eight submarines to intercept the German raiding force.  The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand FleetSir John Jellicoe, recommended attaching his force to provide backup to Warrender but this was not deemed necessary by the Admiralty.

However, while the raid was primarily conducted by Hipper and his force of five battlecruisers (SeydlitzMoltkevon der TannDerrflinger and Blucher) plus accompanying light cruisers and destroyers, he was followed by the might of the German High Seas Fleet under Commander-in-Chief FredErich Ingenohl.

Admiral Franz von HipperDuring the early morning of 16 December – prior to the attack – Warrender came within view of Ingenohl’s fleet but mistook the latter for a small raiding force.  Ingenohl in turn believed Warrender’s force to be Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet.

Deciding caution to be the better virtue Ingenohl turned the High Seas Fleet around en route for home: he nevertheless ordered Hipper to press on with the attack, but omitted to warn him of the British sighting.

Setting off in pursuit of Ingenohl Warrender himself changed course when advised via radio of the start of a bombardment further north – Hipper had begun his raid.  He therefore turned round and headed towards the north-sea coast; meanwhile eight pre-dreadnoughts set off from Rosyth and Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet put off from Scapa Flow, effectively encircling Hipper’s force.

In the event Hipper escaped immediate punishment for his action when an example of inefficient British signalling enabled him to evade Admiral David Beatty’s four battlecruisers, attached to the Grand Fleet.

Amid widespread clamour for the Royal Navy to catch Hipper, the latter’s decision to try and repeat his success in late January 1915 led to his interception at Dogger Bank on 24 January, where his squadron was defeated but managed to escape.

Enhanced by Zemanta